By limiting operating flexibility, real estate investments are found to increase firm risk, thus expected returns. This study introduces product market competition as a critical determinant of the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. As part of capacity strategies, these investments are generally associated with increased market power and lower cash flow volatility in oligopolistic industries. I present a simple model of oligopolistic competition showing a negative relation between real estate holdings and firm beta, and empirically confirm this prediction. Controlling for product market competition enhances identification of the endogenous relation between real estate investments and stock returns.
Introduction
"The company generally owns the land and building or secures long-term leases for restaurant sites, which ensures long-term occupancy rights and helps control related costs... The company identifies and develops sites that offer convenience to customers and long-term sales and profit potential." McDonald's Corporation As this quote from McDonald Corporation's 2011 annual report shows, securing long-term rights to real estate may be of strategic importance for some firms, particularly those operating in real estate intensive industries. 1 The amount and type of real estate a firm owns reflect industry and firm characteristics as well as location and general market conditions. This study explores the impact of product market competition on the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. More specifically, I show that pricing power derived from capital (real estate) investments in oligopolistic industries reduces cash flow volatility, resulting in a negative relation between real estate and stock returns. 2 This study complements and extends Tuzel (2010) , who does not consider industry structure, by highlighting a potential benefit from real estate investments in oligopolistic industries. This study assumes industry structure as exogenous. In contrast, Ambrose et al. (2016) examine the endogenous interaction between capital investments and industry structure under demand uncertainty, and incidentally note the possible effect of demand volatility on the volatility of firm value as industry concentation increases.
Capital investments generally involve a sizable real estate component. By altering financial and operating leverage, growth options, and a firm's ability to benefit from positive economic shocks, these investments certainly affect stock returns (Berk et al. (1999) ; Carlson et al. (2004); Cooper (2006) ; Kogan and Papanikolaou (2013) ). As shown by Tuzel (2010) , frictions in capital adjustment mechanisms, such as limited investment reversibility, may prevent firms from maintaining optimal levels of capital stocks in the event of adverse market shocks, hence leading to a positive relation between capital assets (real estate) and stock returns. 3 Though silent about firm risk, the industrial organization literature has extensively studied and identified benefits from capital investments for oligopolies in terms of pricing power, market protection, and cash flow stability (e.g., Wenders (1971) ; Spence (1977) ; Eaton and Lipsey (1980) ). In summary, the net effect of capital investments, including real estate, on firm risk likely depends on market structure. I argue that the relation between real estate (capital) investments and stock returns is positive in competitive industries, but non-positive in oligopolistic industries due to stronger pricing power and lower cash flow volatility derived from these investments.
The real estate owned by non-real estate firms generally consists of real property assets used in their production activities. 4 Production and marketing strategies normally drive these investments, which affect operational and financial risks. Despite its bulkiness, illiquidity, limited reversibility in the short term, and large asymmetric adjustment costs, real estate represents roughly 28% of corporate balance sheets in 2010 (Ambrose et al. (2016) ), consisting largely of production facilities, warehouses, office buildings, land, and retail outlets. Figure 1 shows that the real estate intensity of corporations from 1970 to 2010. Given these undesirable attributes of real estate that increase firm risk, why do firms still own a considerable amount of real estate?
This study approaches real estate as a factor of production, but a factor different from most inputs since its short-term inflexibility makes it hard for firms to maintain an optimal level in response to demand shocks. 5 I argue that product market competition is a determining factor in the type and amount of real estate that firms own. Capacity and output decisions are important strategic tools available to firms operating in oligopolistic markets. Moreover, capacity expansions generally involve a substantial real estate component. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) note that real estate investments provide firms with options to grow production. But as noted by Grenadier (2002) and Novy-Marx (2007) , competition erodes and may even eliminate the value of growth options. In competitive industries, capacity-increasing investments are likely to yield minimal economic benefits since firms have little to no market power. Capacity investments will generally increase cash flow, unless the additional capacity is left idle for strategic reasons. However, it is 4 Non-real estate firms are firms whose primary business is not directly related to real estate development, investment, management, or financing. The vast majority of these firms acquire or lease real estate to secure an input resource (similar to labor or equipment) to meet future production objectives. 5 It is recognized that some firms may approach real estate investments from a wealth maximization perspective. This dimension of corporate real estate investments is not addressed in this study.
unlikely that capacity investments lower cash flow volatility in competitive markets since all firms are price takers. Consequently, firms undertaking real estate investments in competitive industries will be burdened by the undesirable attributes of real estate and their inability to affect output prices will make them more vulnerable to adverse market shocks. As a result, investors will view these firms as riskier and will therefore require higher returns. 6 In contrast, the effect of real estate investments on firm risk in concentrated (oligopolistic) industries is somewhat more favorable. In this operating environment, capacity investments aimed at creating, consolidating, or protecting economic rents (i.e., profit margins) may stabilize cash flows.
Capacity investments may also lead to stronger product market presence and enhanced bargaining power relative to suppliers. Peress (2010) shows that firms can use their market power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating profits. Thus, capacity investments may act as a hedge against negative supply shocks by allowing firms to transfer these shocks to customers to the extent permitted by the elasticity of demand or to negotiate more favorable pricing terms from suppliers than smaller competitors can. Again, these strategies would only succeed in oligopolistic industries since competition erodes market power. Consequently, it is possible that these economic benefits from real estate investments in oligopolistic markets can temper or even overwhelm the associated undesirable effect on firm risk discussed earlier.
To formally explore this theory and motivate the empirical analysis I propose a simple partial equilibrium model of competition in an oligopolistic output market characterized by heterogeneous firms. Firms use capital assets (real estate) and a fully depreciating input to produce a homogeneous final consumption good. They face asymmetric adjustment costs for capital investments and use a Cobb-Douglas production technology. A detailed description of the model follows later. Since the model cannot be solved algebraically, I carefully choose the parameters following the literature, simulate the firms' investment and production decisions, and compute their average capital investment characteristics and betas. These simulations reveal a negative relation between firm beta and the ratio of capital assets (real estate) to the other input ( Figure 2) . Furthermore, the graphs in Figure 2 show that the slope of the relation between real estate and firm risk flattens as the number of firms increases, but remains non-positive. The fewer the number of competing firms (i.e., the higher industry concentration), the greater a firm's pricing power and the steeper the negative slope of the relation between firm beta and real estate investments.
Next, I empirically test this prediction by examining the return characteristics of a large sample of public non-real estate corporations from 1973 to 2010 using a portfolio approach. I show that the positive relation between real estate investments and stock returns documented in the literature is specific to competitive industries. As predicted by the model, the relation between real estate and stock returns turns negative in concentrated industries, as confirmed by large negative returns on a synthetic long real estate position capturing the difference in returns between the high and low real estate firms. In contrast, a similar synthetic long real estate position in competitive industries produces positive returns, confirming the positive effect of real estate on firm risk documented by Tuzel (2010) since most firms operate in competitive industries. Furthermore, I show that the positive (negative) relation between real estate and stock returns in competitive (concentrated) industries persists after controlling for conventional risk factors. These findings are also robust to various measures of real estate and industry concentration. Since market efficiency normally precludes consistent abnormal returns, these results imply the pricing of some risk factor(s) not captured in the pricing model used to estimate abnormal returns. Finally, real estate appears to alter exposure to the conventional risk factors included in the model in a similar manner in both market structures.
Obviously, intense competition requires nimbleness at all levels of the firm. At the extreme, firms facing cut-throat competition may be better off contracting out production in some cases. But this cannot be true in all competitive industries, especially for oligopolies, since a firm's competitive advantages may be tied to firm-specific assets tied to real estate. These findings do not mean that real estate investments are good or bad for shareholders in competitive or concentrated industries.
Real estate assets affect firm risk, thus ultimately altering the category of investors attracted to these firms.
Possible endogeneity between real estate investments and returns makes identification of the true relation difficult. Some business activities require more real estate than others (e.g., car manufacturing vs. computer production, or retail vs. business services). At the firm level, capital structure may affect real estate decisions, which in turn feed back into capital structure and returns. Con-trolling for product market competition permits a partial disentangling of the endogenous relation between real estate investments and stock returns. 7 I show that the findings persist in the firms' industry-adjusted returns. In summary, corporate real estate strategies should consider industry structure. Renting may be preferable from the perspective of firm risk for firms operating in competitive markets. But the lower cash flow volatility associated with real estate ownership in oligopolistic industries may yield significant benefits. This paper proceeds as follows. Next, I review the relevant literature. The third section presents a model of oligopolistic competitive equilibrium to motivate the study. The fourth section describes the research methodology and data, followed by a discussion of the main empirical results and various robustness checks. Finally, the last section concludes.
Related Literature
Several studies have examined the equilibrium relation between real estate investments and stock returns. Deng and Gyourko (1999) document a weak negative relation between abnormal stock returns and real estate investments for industrial firms. In contrast, Michael et al. (2001) and find no significant link between real estate and abnormal returns. But both studies show that real estate has a significant negative effect on systematic risk, which is not surprising since real estate generally has a low beta. The inconclusiveness of these studies regarding the relation between abnormal stock returns and real estate may be due to endogeneity issues. Also, the use of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets (TA) as a proxy for real estate may be problematic. Deng and Gyourko (1999) find this ratio has a low cross-industry variance. To avoid potential identification problems, several authors focus on retail firms, given the importance of real estate in that industry, and generally document a positive relation between real estate investments and stock returns ; ; Yu and Liow (2009) ). Unfortunately, this finding is not necessarily generalizable to other industries.
7 A simpler approach to dealing with this endogeneity issue is to restrict the analysis to one industry ; Yu and Liow (2009); Ling et al. (2012) ). However, it is difficult to make general statements about the relation between real estate and stock returns from these studies. Tuzel (2010) takes a broader approach in examining the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. Using a portfolio formation methodology, which I adopt in this study, that study finds that real estate increases firm risk resulting in a positive relation with returns. Tuzel argues that the positive effect of real estate on firm risk stems from the operating inflexibility, low depreciation rate, and significant asymmetric adjustment costs associated with real estate as a factor of production. Somewhat similarly, Zhao and Sing (2015) examine corporate real estate ownership decisions in the presence of productivity uncertainty and show that high-risk firms are expected to hold less real estate assets in order to reduce potential operating losses in the event of negative productivity shocks. This documented positive relation between real estate and stock returns normally implies the pricing of some risk directly or indirectly associated with real estate. Ling et al. (2012) empirically examine the pricing of real estate risk for retail firms by examining the sensitivity of firm market and real estate betas to real estate investments. They document a positive relation between firm real estate betas and real estate investments, but unlike other studies (e.g., Deng and Gyourko (1999) ) they find that real estate has no effect on market beta.
In summary, this literature generally documents a positive relation between real estate and stock returns, although real estate appears to reduce firm systematic risk.
The above literature does not consider the possible role of product market competition. Relying on the industrial organization literature on barriers to entry, Ambrose et al. (2016) explores the effect of demand uncertainty on the endogenous interaction of strategic capital investment, industry concentration, and incidentally volatility of firm value. As predicted by Spence (1977) , Dixit (1980), and Tirole (1988) , Ambrose et al. (2016) show that capital investments affect industry concentration by deterring entry. Furthermore, they document that demand volatility decreases capacity investments and increases the volatility of firm value as concentration increases. But capital investments also provide other benefits in oligopolistic industries in addition to entry deterrence. Gaspar and Massa (2006) note that market power reduces information uncertainty for investors and thus dampens return volatility. Peress (2010) shows that firms can use their monopoly power to pass shocks on to customers, thereby protecting profits and reducing cash flow volatility. Aguerrevere (2009) shows that the effect of competition on systematic risk is conditional on demand at the industry level, but systematic risk generally increases with competition even if installed capacity is not sufficient to accommodate current demand, for which Hou and Robinson (2006) present supportive empirical evidence. Finally, Irvine and Pontiff (2009) identify product market competition as a driver of the increase in firm-level volatility documented by Campbell et al. (2001) .
Undoubtedly, product market competition affects strategic operating decisions, which in turn impact the riskiness of operating cash flows. The complicated interaction between capacity decisions (real estate investments), product market competition, and stock returns is the primary focus of this study. In contrast to Ambrose et al. (2016) , I assume that industry structure is exogenous, do not model demand volatility, and focus on oligopoly pricing power and its effect on cash flow volatility, rather than on entry deterrence. But similar to Tuzel (2010) and Ambrose et al. (2016) I view real estate investment from a technological perspective. 8
Model
The following model describes an oligopolistic output market in which firms elect whether to invest in capital assets (real estate) every period and use a fully depreciating input resource (e.g., raw materials, labor, or another form of fully depreciating capital) to produce a homogeneous final consumption good. The model of production and asset pricing borrows somewhat from Tuzel (2010) while the equilibrium concept known as extended oblivious equilibrium fully detailed in the equilibrium concept and compution section that follows is taken from Weintraub et al. (2010) .
Whereas the model in Tuzel (2010) is a general equilibrium model that assumes perfect competition in the output market, this model is a partial market equilibrium model in which the consumer's decision problem is not explicitly modeled. But as a important differentiating characteristic of this model, firms are allowed to have pricing power based on capacity installed in an oligopolistic competition setting. I allow heterogeneity in production capacity, which leads to heterogeneity in market power.
Demand
The focus of this paper is the real estate investment decisions and stock returns for firms in an oligopolistic industry of N firms that produce a homogeneous final good Q i,t with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . N } and t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ∞}. The aggregate demand for the final good in period t,
where P t is the good's equilibrium market price, Z t is a market-wide demand shock, γ 1 is the elasticity of demand, and γ 0 is a positive demand shifter. The inverse aggregate demand function is then given by
I assume that Z t , the market-wide demand shock, follows the AR(1) process in logs of the form
with ρ Z representing the persistence of the shock and u t representing the stochastic component of the shock that is distributed IID normal with variance σ 2 Z .
Supply
I assume that the N firms are equity-financed. Firm i produces output Q i,t at the beginning of period t using real estate capital K i,t and the fully depreciating input L i,t . I assume that firms must use the entirety of installed capacity to produce the final good. The output is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function
A i,t is a Hicks-neutral idiosyncratic productivity shock which also follows the AR(1) process in
with ρ A representing the persistence of the shock. v i,t is the stochastic component of the shock that is distributed IID normal with variance σ 2 A . I assume v i,t and v j,t are uncorrelated for any pair (i, j) with i = j and that u t and v i,t are independent.
Real estate capital K i,t is purchased in a perfectly competitive market and depreciates over time at rate δ. The law of motion for capital is therefore
where I i,t is firm i's capital investment at time t, which will be available for production at the beginning of period t + 1. This capital investment is subject to asymmetric quadratic adjustment costs given by
The asymmetric adjustment costs capture the fact that it is more costly to decrease real estate holdings than to expand them. Firms incur no adjustment costs during periods when investment is zero.
Firms seek to maximize their expected present discounted value of profits by making a sequence of investment and input purchasing decisions. Formally, firm i's sequence problem is max
and r is the real interest rate, which is exogenously determined since the consumer problem is not modeled. Assuming that input markets are perfectly competitive so that firms take input prices as given, firm i's profit function at time t, which also represents the amount of dividends to shareholders since firms are equity financed, is
Asset Pricing
Firm i 's consumption cost of capital (Tobin's q) at time t from Equation 1 can be expresssed as follows
Assuming the firm can liquidate its capital stock at this price, the value of firms equity at time t (E i,t ) is then equal to the market value of its assets in place, namely
and the dividend firm i pays to shareholders is
The rate of return for a firm's equity shareholders is therefore r e i,t+1 = ln
In this paper, the main objects of interest are the firm betas and their relation with firm real estate capital holdings K i,t . Let r vw,t+1 be the value-weighted average firm return (i.e., the aggregate stock market return). Then firm i's beta at time t is
Var t (r vw,t+1 )
where the variance and covariance are calculated using the previous 100 periods.
Equilibrium Concept and Computation
The firms' investment and input decisions cannot be solved algebraically. In order to determine the relation between market structure, capital holdings, and firm betas, an equilibrium concept must be chosen that is both computationally feasible and allows independent variation of the number of firms N . To do so, the study adopts a slightly modified version of extended oblivious equilibrium from Weintraub et al. (2010) that disallows firm entry. Conditional on today's value of the aggregate industry shock, each firm tracks the long-run average industry state. That is, rather than tracking every other firm's capital holdings and productivity and responding appropriately, each firm follows a strategy that is "oblivious" in the sense that it responds to a hypothetical average firm and is oblivious to the actions of any particular competitor. This equilibrium concept is explained in greater detail in the appendix section. The equilibrium is computed using an algorithm described in the appendix. After an equilibrium is found, a panel dataset of variables from the model is simulated using the equilibrium strategies.
Parameterization and Results
The parameters of the model are not calibrated to match any particular industry. They are chosen to be plausible as a real data generating process and closely match the parameter values in previous empirical studies (Kydland and Prescott (1982) ; Cooley and Prescott (1995); Tuzel (2010) ). Table   1 presents the chosen parameter values for the model. The persistence and standard deviation of systematic demand shocks (ρ Z and σ Z ) are set to 0.8 and 0.025, respectively. I set the demand elasticity (γ 1 ) to 2 and the demand shifter (γ 0 ) to 25 in order to generate variation in capital holding across firms. The capital share (α), persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks (ρ A ), and standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks (σ A ) are 0.36, 0.8, and 0.05, respectively.
I assume a reasonable capital depreciation rate (δ) of 0.02 and, and set the low and high capital adjustment costs (η Low and η high ) to 0.8 and 1.6, respectively -I set the value of the high capital adjustment cost equal to twice that of the low adjustment cost. 9 Finally, I use a real interest rate of 0.04, which is adequate for the period covered by the study, and normalize the price of the fully depreciating input to 1. Table 3 of Tuzel (2010) , this model of an oligopolistic industry produces a slightly negative relation between relative capital holdings and firm risk as measured by firm betas. Furthermore, this relation appears to weaken as the industry becomes more competitive; the trend is very flat when there are 100 firms in the industry compared to when there are just 8 or 10 firms. Since firms with market power may face incentives to hold relatively illiquid capital assets such as real estate capital in order to maintain their competitive position, investments in such firms may be less risky than investments in firms with less productive capacity.
Empirical Analysis Methodology
The design of the empirical analysis is as follows. First, I assign firms to industries every year based on their SIC codes 10 and estimate the level of competition in the industries. I compute the 9 The results are unchanged when the ratio of high to low adjustment costs is set even higher 10 I check the robustness of the main findings to alternative SIC classifications and the allocation of firms to industries according to Fama and French (1992) industries.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the industries as
where s ij is the market share of firm i in industry j, which contains N firms. HHI is a measure of market concentration. As is common in the literature, I estimate market share as the ratio of firm sales to total industry sales. Therefore, a high HHI is indicative of a concentrated industry dominated by few large firms, whereas a low HHI is indicative of a competitive industry. Since changes in industry concentrations are likely to be gradual, following Hou and Robinson (2006) I assign to each industry its three-year average HHI and classify the industries according to that measure into concentration quintiles. The industries in the first quintile represent competitive industries and those in the fifth quintile represent concentrated (oligopolistic) industries. Again, I perform this classification annually. Next, I separately mix the firms in the competitive and concentrated industry groups and sort each group of firms into decile portfolios according to the amount of real estate on the firms' balance sheets. I then track the performance of the portfolios over the next 12 months before starting over the double sorting along industry concentration and then real estate assets.
If product market competition has no effect on the relation between real estate investments and firm risk, the behavior of portfolio returns relative to the firms' real estate assets should be similar in the competitive and concentrated industry groups. However, the model predicts that the relation between returns and real estate will be non-positive in concentrated industries. First, I compare the performance of the portfolios using average excess returns over the risk-free rate and average industry-adjusted returns (i.e., average of the firms' returns over their respective industry's average returns). 11 If industry concentration and real estate are not determining return factors, and absent any serious sampling problems, there should be no significant differences between the portfolio returns in competitive and concentrated industries. Based on the findings of the existing literature, I expect average portfolio returns to be positively correlated with real estate assets in competitive industries. As argued, the story is more complicated in concentrated industries. Even though real estate investments still reduce operating flexibility in those industries due to the associated asymmetric adjustment costs, the resulting increase in pricing power will weaken or even cancel out that negative effect as shown by the model's predictions.
Even though the finding of significant differences in the portfolios' excess and industry-adjusted returns suffices to conclude that real estate affects stock returns, it cannot be automatically interpreted as evidence that the market prices some risk associated with real estate investments. To explore this further, the next step of the analysis considers whether the portfolios generate significant differences in abnormal returns after controlling for conventional risk factors and the extent to which these abnormal returns are related to the amount of real estate owned by the portfolios' component firms. The portfolios' abnormal returns are estimated from monthly return series using the following three-factor market model:
where the dependent variable is the monthly returns of portfolio i (r i,t ) minus the risk-free rate (r f,t ) and the pricing factors are monthly excess market returns (r m,t − r f,t ) and monthly returns on the Fama and French (1992) benchmark size and book-to-market portfolios, smb t and hml t , respectively. The scalar α i represents portfolio i 's abnormal return (alpha) during the period. The coefficients β i , γ i , and δ i represent portfolio i 's systematic risk and loadings on the Fama-French size and book-to-market risk factors, respectively. Finally, the vector ε i contains the portfolio's return error terms.
If equation (4) properly accounts for all risk factors priced by the market, the estimated portfolio abnormal returns should not be statistically different from zero. Otherwise, I cannot categorically reject that product market competition, real estate ownership, or both affect stock returns.
However, the finding of insignificant abnormal returns does not contradict the main argument of this paper either. Therefore, it is difficult to make definitive predictions about the relation between abnormal portfolio returns and real estate investments. However, I expect this relation to be non-negative in competitive industries and non-positive in concentrated industries. I match the stock return and accounting data following Fama and French (1992) to ensure that the accounting information used to create the portfolios is available prior to the stock return data it is meant to explain and already impounded into stock prices. This is done by matching CRSP monthly stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 with accounting information for the fiscal year t -1, which results in stock returns lagging the release of the accounting data by at least six months. Then, I assign firms to industries at the end of June every year according to the first three digits of their Compustat SIC codes. 13 Next, I compute the industries' HHI using net sales as explained earlier. I then drop industries with fewer than three firms, which eliminates monopolies, and classify the remaining industries into concentration quintiles according to the industries' threeyear average HHI. This three-year smoothing and the lagging of stock returns relative to accounting data reduce the final sample to 37 years, spanning July 1973 through June 2010. Again, I perform the industry classification at the end of June every year and keep the resulting industry quintiles for the next 12 months from July through June.
Next, I separately classify the firms in the competitive and concentration industry quintiles into ten portfolios each according to the amount of real estate assets in PPE at the end of June and track the performance of the portfolios over the next 12 months. 14 12 I use 1970 as a starting date to reduce any potential bias toward large firms since Nasdaq firms were added to CRSP in 1973. Also, the Compustat PPE component accounts required for this analysis were sparsely populated prior to 1970.
13 Even though Compustat and CRSP SIC codes do not perfectly match (Kahle and Walkling, 1996) , the outcome of the analysis is unchanged when I use CRSP SIC codes for the industry classification. I also show that the results obtain when I use two-digit SIC codes or the Fama-French industries.
14 Compustat breaks down PPE accounts into buildings, machinery and equipment, capitalized leases, land and
Descriptive Statistics
The final sample contains 7,736 firms classified into 171 industries according to their three-digit SIC codes and consists of 71,885 firm-years, representing on average 1,943 firms per year. Table   2 summarizes the distributional characteristics of the industries' annual and three-year moving average HHI. I also report in Table 2 concentration figures based on total assets for comparison purposes. Despite the exclusion of industries with fewer than three firms, the industries' HHI vary considerably, from 0.04 (indicative of a highly competitive industry) to 0.997 (reflective of a highly concentrated industry). Table 2 also shows that the distributional characteristics of the four measures of industry concentration are very similar. Additionally, Figure 3 reveals that the distribution of industry HHI is not constant over the sample period. The first moments of the distributions vary considerably over time but remain interlocked, moving together over time. Hence, any of these concentration measures should adequately capture the variation in industry concentration present in the data and can be used for the classification of industries into quintile concentration groups.
As noted previously, I use three-year moving average sales HHI (HHI MA (sales)) in Table 2 and throughout the rest of the paper as the main industry concentration measure.
The sample period witnessed two distinct waves of industry consolidation. The first and strongest wave started in the mid-1970s and crested in the early 1990s. It resulted in average HHI increasing by roughly 45% from 0.29 in 1976 to 0.42 in 1990. Also, the last decade witnessed a milder surge in industry consolidation. The first wave coincided with a surge in hostile takeovers, partly facilitated by an expansion of the junk bond market that collapsed as the economy went into recession in the early 1990s (Carney (2009); Lipton (2006) ). The latter wave was driven by a number of factors, including globalization, a rise in commodity prices, low interest rates, shareholder activism, hedge funds, and growth in private equity funds (Lipton (2006) ). These exogenous shocks to industry concentration should facilitate identification of the role of product market competition in the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. Table 3 unequivocally reject the null hypothesis of equal means between the two groups. Figure 4 further highlights the difference in competitiveness between the two groups of industries.
Industry Concentration Quintiles
The gap between the two curves tracing average HHI of the high and low concentration groups never narrows over the study period. Furthermore, each series displays the two waves of industry consolidation noted earlier, indicating that they were not limited to specific industries. 17 Given the pronounced structural differences between these two groups of industries, a comparison the effects of real estate investments on stock returns in these industries should yield valuable insight into the role of industry structure, if any. Table 4 lists the average characteristics of firms in the competitive and concentrated industry quintiles. As the number of firms drops with industry concentration, average firm size (measured by sales, total assets, or market value of equity) predictably increases. Firms operating in concentrated industries are roughly twice the size of those in competitive industries. In addition, book-to-market value increases with industry concentration; firms operating in competitive industries are more growth-oriented due to their constant need to undertake value-enhancing innovations (Hou and Robinson (2006) ). Lewis (1986, 1988) note that product market competition affects capital structure decisions. Both leverage and long-term debt ratios are positively correlated with industry concentration. Since firms operating in concentrated industries are larger and experience less cash flow volatility, they are able to sustain higher levels of debt (Jensen and Meckling (1976); Myers (1984) ; Myers and Majluf (1984); Jensen (1986) ). Table 4 clearly reveals significant differences in size and capital structure between firms in competitive and concentrated 15 For example, two representative industries of the concentrated and competitive industry groups are rubber products and restaurants, respectively.
16 Firm i's contribution to industry j 's HHI is s 2 ij in Equation (3). 17 Figure 4 shows that an alternative industry classification technique consisting of setting fixed HHI bands throughout the sample period, rather than annually resetting these thresholds, would not materially alter the findings. industries, as evidenced by the strong rejection of the null of equal mean values for all variables.
These differences certainly affect cash flows and should therefore be reflected in stock returns.
There is also a clear difference between the two groups of industries with respect to the amount of real estate and other productive assets they own. The last four columns of Table 4 reveal an interesting fact about the nature of the firms' real estate investments. Columns 9 and 10 show that firms operating in concentrated industries invest significantly more in buildings, land, and fixed assets in general than those operating in competitive industries. Relatively, firms in competitive industries are more likely to use leases (columns 7 and 8). Firms operating in concentrated industries may be more reluctant to use leasing due to a higher proportion of firm-specific investments, stronger cash flows, or both. Their higher capital intensity may also be a factor.
Real Estate Decile Portfolios
After classifying the sample into quintile industry concentration groups, I separately sort the firms in the low and high quintile groups into decile portfolios according to the firms' real estate investments. Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of the firms in the first (low) and the tenth (high) real estate decile portfolios of the competitive and concentrated quintile industries. As in Tuzel (2010) , I sort the firms into decile portfolios according to the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to PPE. 18 Whether measured by sales, assets, or market value, the average size of the firms in the tenth real estate decile is two to three times that of the firms in the first real estate decile in competitive industries. The difference in average firm size between the first and tenth decile portfolios is even more pronounced in concentrated industries where firms in the top decile portfolio are on average more than 8 times larger in terms of sales. As noted previously, firms operating in concentrated industries are generally larger, have higher book-to-market values, and are more levered, as evidenced by the significant cross-industry difference in mean tests reported in Table   5 .
A close comparison of the first three columns of tables 4 and 5 reveals an interesting fact about the relation between firm size and real estate investments. These columns show that real estate is positively correlated with firm size in concentrated industries. For example, the average firm 18 This study's main findings remain unchanged when I use alternative real estate measures as discussed later.
sales of $2.90 billion in concentrated industries (column 1 in Table 4 ) lies between the first decile portfolio's average firm sales of $900 million and the tenth decile portfolio's average firm sale $3.06 billion (column 1 of Table 5 ). In contrast, firms in competitive industries do not display the same monotonic pattern: the average firm sales of $1.28 billion for the industry group in Table 4 is outside those of the first and tenth decile portfolios ($331 and $703 million) in Table 5 . This non-monotonic relation between real estate investments and firm size may be due to greater heterogeneity within that group of industries. Table 5 also shows a striking difference in the portfolios' real estate and fixed assets (columns 7 to 10). Depending on the measure of real estate used, firms in the high real estate decile have on average 8 to 22 times more real estate than those in the low real estate decile in the competitive and concentrated industry groups, despite a much smaller difference is fixed assets.
In summary, Table 5 highlights two important points. First, average characteristics of firms in competitive and concentrated industries are significantly different; competitive industries largely include growth firms. Second, the low real estate decile firms in both industry groups are smaller, more growth-oriented, and less levered. These significant differences in firm characteristics between the low and high decile portfolios should normally affect the portfolios' performance.
Main Results
In this section, I present the performance of the real estate sorted portfolios in competitive and Table 6 repeats the analysis with the portfolios of firms operating in concentrated industries. In contrast to the previous results, both portfolio return series decrease with the portfolios' real estate rankings. The portfolios' average excess returns drop from 11.3% for the low decile to 4.8% for the top decile (shown in the top-right quadrant of Figure 5 ). Basically, high real estate firms appear to be less risky in concentrated industries compared to competitive industries. The above portfolio returns are value-weighted averages, but the findings are unchanged with equally-weighted average returns (Table . 1 of the appendix).
As noted, real estate investments affect capital structure and may therefore also alter stock returns through that channel. Even though it is unclear how leverage may differently affect stock returns in competitive and concentrated industry, it is important that I adjust portfolio returns for leverage since the model assumes that firms are equity financed. 20 Table 7 reports value-weighted average unlevered excess and industry-adjusted returns of the decile portfolios in competitive and concentrated industries. As expected, average unlevered portfolio returns are lower than the corresponding levered returns presented in Table 6 , reflecting the positive effect of leverage on equity returns (in bottom-left quadrant of Figure 5 ). For example, the average unlevered excess returns 19 The fact that real estate ownership is associated with higher firm risk is not necessarily bad. As firms undertake such investments, they may become more attractive to different investor clientèles.
20 I compute unlevered stock returns (rU ) using the following formula that assumes no taxes:
where rL and rD are levered stock return (return from CRSP in this case) and average cost of debt, respectively. D and E stand for market value of debt and equity. I assume an average cost of debt of 7% across the board -the results are robust to changes in the average cost of debt.
of the low and high decile portfolios in competitive industries are 2.6% and 6.7%, compared to levered returns of 4.7% and 10.6%, respectively. Furthermore, the relation between average unlevered returns and real estate investments remains positive and generally monotonic in competitive industries (Panel A of Table 7 ). Despite controlling for leverage, the difference between the high and low decile portfolios' returns remain large and statistically significant. For example, the difference between the high and low portfolios' average unlevered excess returns is 4.1%, though lower than the 5.9% difference in levered returns. More importantly, the behavior of unlevered portfolio excess and industry-adjusted returns in concentrated markets (Panel B Table 7 and bottom-right quadrant of Figure 5 ) is similar to that of levered returns discussed earlier. The portfolios' average unlevered excess returns decrease from 8.2% to 3.0%, giving a difference unlevered excess returns of -5.2% between the high and low decile portfolios, compared to a difference in levered returns of -6.5%.
The unlevered portfolio returns generally confirm the conclusions derived from levered returns. The portfolios' returns increase with their real estate rankings in competitive industries and decline in concentrated industries. Again, the results are unchanged when equally weighted returns are used.
However, controlling for leverage may improve identification of the potential role of product market competition on the relation between real estate investments and stock returns. But it is important to control for industry fixed-effects as well since some industries are more real estate intensive than others. Consequently, it is comforting that unlevered industry adjusted returns reported in Panel B of Table 7 support this study's predictions.
Abnormal Portfolio Returns:
So far, I have largely abstracted from risk considerations. In this section, I explore whether the documented difference in portfolio performance in competitive and concentrated industries also materializes in abnormal portfolio returns. The finding of significant abnormal portfolio returns after controlling for conventional pricing factors may reveal the channel through which product market competition alters the relation between real estate and stock returns. Table 8 reports abnormal portfolio returns from the estimation of model (4) using the portfolios' monthly value-weighted unlevered excess returns. The abnormal returns of competitive industry portfolios are generally significant (both statistically and economically) and increase from -3.1% for the low real estate decile portfolio to 1.9% for the high real estate decile portfolio, a difference in abnormal return of 4.9%. Table 8 also shows estimated abnormal portfolio returns in concentrated industries, which are negatively related to the portfolios' real estate rankings. The estimated abnormal returns of the low and high decile portfolios are 2.5% and -2.5%, respectively, resulting in a significant difference in abnormal return of -5.1%. This significant negative relation between real estate and stock returns in concentrated industries is an important finding, for it goes beyond the weak prediction of a non-positive relation set out initially. Untabulated estimations using equally weighted unlevered portfolio returns produce similar results in competitive and concentrated industries. These findings also obtain when I use levered excess returns (Table . 2 of the appendix).
Therefore, these documented relations between abnormal portfolio returns and real estate investments are not driven by either leverage or exposure to the conventional risk factors included in model (4) . 21 Finding significant abnormal returns does not necessary imply that the market prices some real estate risk. It is possible that real estate ownership is correlated with an omitted risk factor. The challenge is that any search for abnormal return is conditional on the pricing model and the data.
Assuming that the model is correctly specified and that there are no significant data issues, the portfolios should normally produce insignificant average abnormal returns. I follow the literature in terms of model selection, even running the risk of sacrificing efficiency by adopting a multifactor market model rather than the more parsimonious capital asset pricing model. And even though the estimated abnormal returns could be data-driven, the long sample period of 37 years and the relatively low risk of selection bias, given the sample size, provide some reassurance. Also the conditioning of the portfolios on real estate seems reasonable since it is unlikely that investors would disregard such information when pricing stocks while generally reacting to corporate real estate acquisitions and disposals as documented by event studies (Hite et al. (1984) ; Slovin et al. (1990) ; Glascock et al. (1991); Myer et al. (1992) ; McIntosh et al. (1995) ; Rodriguez and Sirmans (1996) ).
In summary, the evidence presented shows that real estate investments and stock returns are 21 The results remain materially unchanged when I use a four-factor model adding a market momentum factor to model (4) . positively related in competitive industries and negatively related in concentrated industries. Since the positive return effect in competitive industries appears to be statistically stronger and most industries are relatively competitive, it is likely that this effect dominates in studies that do not control for industry concentration.
Real Estate and Portfolio Risk-Factor Loadings:
The effects of real estate on stock returns is not restricted to the evidence from abnormal returns discussed in the previous section. Real estate investments also affect exposure to conventional risk factors. To capture these effects I estimate equation (4) using monthly returns on the high real estate decile portfolio minus monthly returns on the low real estate decile portfolio, which can be interpreted as a synthetic long real estate position. The regression coefficient estimates from this high-minus-low real estate position in Table 9 provides valuable insights. Regardless of industry structure, real estate investments appear to lower market beta and sensitivity to the size risk factor, and to increase exposure to the book-to-market risk factor. These findings are quite intuitive. It has been documented that real estate investment lowers market beta (Deng and Gyourko (1999) ). Also, the positive correlation between real estate and size may explain the negative size effect and positive book-to-market effect of real estate. The fact that the directions of these effects transcend industry considerations means that the opposing effects of product market competition on the interaction between real estate investments and stock returns are captured in the portfolios' abnormal returns.
It is thus conceivable that factors beyond those included in the model might explain the observed return reversal.
Furthermore, a comparison of the portfolios' estimated factor loadings (unreported) confirms that firms operating in competitive industries have on average higher market betas, as predicted by Aguerrevere (2009) , and are more exposed to the size risk factor, which should normally lead to higher returns overall as documented by Hou and Robinson (2006) .
Robustness Checks
The previous portfolio returns apply to the 37-year period from July 1973 to June 2010. I assigned firms to industries according to the first three digit of their SIC codes and I classified industries into HHI quintiles and sort firms in the low and high quintile groups into decile portfolios according the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases in PPE. In this section, I check that the study's findings are not specific to the selected sample period and are robust to alternative industry classification methods and real estate measures.
The U.S. economy is still recovering from the Great Recession brought about by the collapse of the housing market and resulting financial crisis. Although it is not clear how such a tail event toward the end of the sample period might have affected the results, it is important to ensure that the findings are robust to the exclusion of that period of relatively high uncertainty. Table 10 reports the abnormal portfolio returns from July 1973 to June 2005, which almost coincides with the period covered by Tuzel (2010) . To save space, I only report the returns on the High-Low decile portfolios which capture the effects of real estate as discussed earlier. As Table 10 shows, the results are unaffected by the exclusion of the Great Recession. The difference in abnormal returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios is positive and significant in competitive industries and negative and significant in concentrated industries. In fact, these results are even slightly stronger than the base-case results, indicating that the inclusion of the real estate driven recession might have biased the main findings downward.
The evidence presented so far results from the performance of real estate decile portfolios. But if the argument advanced in this paper is correct, quintile portfolios should also provide some supporting, albeit weaker, evidence since the difference in real estate holdings between the high and low quintile portfolios is smaller relative to that of corresponding decile portfolios. The outcome of such an analysis presented in column 2 of Table 11 confirms this prediction -column 1 reports High-Low returns from Table 7 . The differences in average excess and industry-adjusted returns between the high and low real estate quintile portfolios are lower in absolute terms than the corresponding differences in decile returns reproduced in column 1. Also, a comparison of the average returns on the low and high quintile portfolios (not shown in Table 11 ) and the corresponding decile portfolio returns further corroborates this study's predictions. In competitive industries, the average return on the low quintile portfolio is higher than on the low decile portfolio, while the corresponding return on the high quintile portfolio is lower than on the high decile portfolio. This interesting finding further confirms the positive relation between real estate and stock returns in competitive industries. In contrast, the average return on the low quintile portfolio in concentrated industries is lower than on the low decile portfolio, as expected, but the corresponding average returns on the high quintile and decile portfolios are roughly similar, hence confirming the predicted non-positive relation between real estate and stock returns in concentrated industries.
Table 11 also reports the difference in excess and industry-adjusted returns between the high and low decile portfolios when firms are classified into industries according to their two-digit SIC codes (Column 3) and the 48 Fama-French industries (Column 4), a widely used industry classification method in finance studies. 22 Overall, these results confirm the previous findings, However, the Fama-French industry classification method produces stronger results than the two-digit SIC industry classification method since it involves more industries. Surprisingly, the Fama-French classification method performs as well as the three-digit SIC classification used in the base case, even though it results in a much smaller number of industry groups (48 versus 171). It is possible that the Fama-French classification technique results in more homogeneous industry groups, which may help facilitate identification. The last column of Table 11 gives differences in average returns when I use total assets in lieu of net sales to compute industry concentrations. Since total assets and net sales are highly correlated and share similar distributional characteristics as Table 2 and Figure 3 show, the results in column 5 are almost identical to the base-case results in column 1. Table 12 reports excess and industry-adjusted returns under alternative measures of real estate ownership. In the base case (column 1), firms are classified into portfolios according to RER1, the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to PPE. Using RER2, a broader measure of real estate that adds construction in progress and land to RER1, does not significantly alter the results (column 2). RER3, the ratio of buildings and land to PPE, also leads to similar results (untabulated). PPER, the ratio of PPE to TA, however, appears to be a poor proxy for real estate, as this measure produces negative but insignificant results in concentrated industries (column 3). Intuitively, the more broadly that real estate is defined, the more serious the identification problem becomes, leading to insignificant results. This may explain why Deng and Gyourko (1999) and other authors who use this measure find weak or insignificant results. Measuring a firm's real estate intensity in terms of deviation from its industry's average using ARER, which is equal to RER1 minus average industry RER1, in column 4 leads to slightly stronger results in competitive industries and confirms the non-positive relation between real estate and stock returns in concentrated industries.
As Table 3 shows, firms in competitive and concentrated industries are significantly different, particularly with respect to size: firms operating in concentrated industries are considerably larger.
Could this size difference between firms in competitive and concentrated industries explain the findings? This study is not comparing portfolio returns in competitive industries to portfolio returns in concentrated industries. Rather, it compares portfolio returns within each industry concentration group separately. Therefore, the difference in average firm size between the two groups should be immaterial. The documented relations are more about differences in the portfolios' returns relative to real estate assets than overall portfolio returns, which normally capture any size effect. Finally, the findings materialize not only in average excess and industry-adjusted portfolio returns, but also in abnormal portfolio returns generated from a pricing model controlling for the size risk factor.
The fact that these relations evidence themselves in abnormal returns represents strong evidence that firm size is probably not a determining factor in the importance of product market competition in the relation between real estate and stock returns.
Conclusion
This study extends the literature by introducing product market competition as a determining factor in the relation between real estate investments and firm risk. Approaching these capital investments from a technology perspective and borrowing from the industrial organization literature, I propose a model of capital investment decisions in oligopolistic industries and empirically show that the relation between real estate investments and firm risk is non-positive to negative in that environment. Therefore, the positive relation between real estate investments and stock returns documented in the literature applies to competitive industries where firms enjoys no pricing power, resulting in more volatile cash flows. The findings persist after controlling for capital structure and adjusting returns for exposure to conventional risk factors. Managers must certainly consider the competitive environment and their firms' strategic objectives when considering real estate investments, particularly for firms operating in highly competitive industries. Capital markets being relatively efficient at pricing risk, whether from real estate or other sources, the amount of real estate assets owned by a firm ultimately affects the type of investors attracted to that stock. Figure 2 : Scatter plots of average firm betas against average capital-to-other-input ratios for firms sorted on their capital-to-other-input ratio in each period. Betas are computed using the previous 100 periods and averages are taken over all 10,000 simulated periods. 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Median ( 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Low-concentration industries High-concentration industries The study sample consists of 7,736 industrial firms spanning the 37-year period from 1973 to 2010. Firms are assigned to industries according to their three-digit SIC codes, when are then divided into HHI quintiles. The above statistics are the 37-year averages. Sales, TA, and MV, stand respectively for net sales, total assets, and market value of equity, in 2010 U.S. dollars (millions). Book to market (BM ) is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. LEV is the ratio of book value of total liabilities to total market value of firm. LTDR is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to MV plus book value of long-term debt. RER1, RER2, and RER3 are, respectively, the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (PPE); the ratio of buildings, capitalized leases, construction in progress, and land to PPE; and the ratio of buildings and land to PPE. PPER is the ratio PPE to TA. The study sample consists of 7,736 industrial firms spanning the 37-year period from 1973 to 2010. Firms are assigned to industries according to their three-digit SIC codes. At the end of June each year, the industries are then grouped into quintiles according to their three-year average salesHHI. Firms in the competitive and concentrated industry groups are then ranked into decile portfolios according to their real estate ownership proxied by REI1 defined below. The above statistics are the portfolios' 37-year averages. Sales, TA, and MV, stand respectively for net sales, total assets, and market value of equity, in 2010 U.S. dollars (millions). Book to market (BM ) is the ratio of book value of equity (TA minus total liabilities plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus book value of preferred stocks) to market value of equity. LEV is the ratio of book value of total liabilities to total market value of firm. LTDR is the ratio of book value of long-term debt to MV plus book value of long-term debt. RER1, RER2, and RER3 are, respectively, the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (PPE); the ratio of buildings, capitalized leases, construction in progress, and land to PPE; and the ratio of buildings and land to PPE. PPER is the ratio PPE to TA. The table reports annualized value-weighted average monthly levered excess returns (in percent) earned by the real estate ranked portfolios in competitive and concentrated industry groups for the 444-month period July 1973-June 2010 and the t-statistics (italicized figures in parentheses). Columns 1 (labeled Low ) through 10 (labeled High) represent stock portfolios ranked in increasing order of real estate ownership, proxied by the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (RER1 ). Excess Return is the excess return over the risk-free rate, proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. Ind. Adj. Return stands for industry-adjusted return, the excess return over the average return of an industry portfolio including firms sharing the same three-digit SIC codes. The column labeled High-Low reports differences in returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios. The table reports annualized value-weighted average monthly unlevered excess returns (in percent) earned by the real estate ranked portfolios in competitive and concentrated industry groups for the 444-month period July 1973-June 2010 and the t-statistics (italicized figures in parentheses). Unlevered return calculations assume no take taxes and a cost of the debt of 7% across the board. Columns 1 (labeled Low ) through 10 (labeled High) represent the stock portfolios ranked in increasing order of real estate ownership, proxied by the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (RER1 ). Excess Return is the excess return over the risk-free rate, proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. Ind. Adj. Return stands for industry-adjusted return, the excess return over the average return of an industry portfolio including firms sharing the same three-digit SIC codes. The column labeled High-Low reports differences in returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios. This table reports estimated abnormal portfolio returns (in percent and annualized) from value-weighted monthly unlevered excess portfolio returns in competitive and concentrated industries. The italicized figures in parentheses are the robust t-statistics of the coefficient estimates. Unlevered return calculations assume no taxes and a cost of debt of 7% across the board. These estimates are based on the three-factor model 4 consisting of the excess market return (rm − r f ) and the two Fama and French stock risk factors, smb and hml. Columns 1 (labeled Low ) through 10 (labeled High)
represent the stock portfolios ranked in increasing order of real estate ownership, proxied by the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (RER1 ). rm − r f represents the value-weighted monthly returns on CRSP-listed stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. smb and hml are the average returns on small-stock portfolios minus the average return on big-stock portfolios and the average return on value-stock portfolios minus the average return on growth-stock portfolios, respectively. Monthly stock return data are from CRSP, with rm, r f , smb, and hml from Kenneth French's website. The column labeled High-Low reports abnormal returns from differences in excess returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios. This table presents the regression results of differences in value-weighted unlevered excess returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios. Average unexplained returns (alpha) are in percent and annualized. rm,t − r f,t represents the value-weighted monthly returns on CRSP-listed stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. smb and hml are the average returns on small-stock portfolios minus the average return on big-stock portfolios and the average return on value-stock portfolios minus the average return on growth-stock portfolios, respectively. The italicized figures in parentheses are the robust t-statistics of the coefficient estimates. (1 ) and (2 ) apply to competitive industries; columns (1´) and (2´) are for concentrated industries. These estimates are based on the three-factor model 4 consisting of the excess market return (rm,t − r f,t ) and the two Fama and French stock risk factors, smb and hml. Average unexplained excess returns are annualized values. rm,t − r f,t represents the value-weighted monthly returns on CRSP-listed stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. smb and hml are the average returns on small-stock portfolios minus the average return on big-stock portfolios and the average return on value-stock portfolios minus the average return on growth-stock portfolios, respectively. The table reports differences in value-weighted average unlevered excess and industry-adjusted returns (in percent) between the high and low real estate decile portfolios during the 444-month period from July 1973 to June 2010 and their t-statistics (italicized figures in parentheses). Column 1 represents the Base Case (High-Low returns from Table 7) . Column 2 lists returns on quintile, rather than decile, portfolios based on RER1. In column 3, firms are assigned to industries according to their two-digit SIC codes and in column 4 according to the 48 Fama and industry groups. In column 5, industry concentrations are based on total assets, rather than net sales. The table reports differencesf in value-weighted average unlevered excess and industry-adjusted returns (in percent) between the high and low real estate decile portfolios during the 444-month period from July 1973 to June 2010 and their t-statistics (italicized figures in parentheses). In column 1, the Base Case (High-Low returns from Table 7 ), firms are sorted into decile portfolios according to RER1, the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (PPE). The figures in columns 2 to 4 are based on different measures of real estate ownership. RER2 and PPER are respectively the ratio of buildings, capitalized leases, construction in progress, and land to PPE, and the ratio PPE to total assets (TA). ARER is firm RER1 minus the average industry RER1 (i.e., firms belonging to the same three-digit SIC codes). The table reports annualized equally-weighted average monthly levered returns (in percents) earned by the real estate ranked portfolios in the competitive and concentrated industry groups) for the 444-month period from July 1973 to June 2010 and their t-statistics (italicized figures in parentheses). Columns 1 (labeled Low ) through 10 (labeled High) represent the stock portfolios ranked in increasing order of real estate ownership, proxied by the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (RER1 ). Excess Return is the excess return over the risk-free rate, proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. Ind. Adj. Return stands for industry-adjusted return and is the excess return over the average return of an industry portfolio regrouping firms sharing the same three-digit SIC codes. The column labeled High-Low reports differences in returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios. This table reports estimated abnormal portfolio returns (in percent and annualized) from value-weighted monthly levered excess portfolio returns in competitive industries. The italicized figures in parentheses are the robust t-statistics of the coefficient estimates. These estimates are based on the three-factor model 4 consisting of the excess market return (rm,t − r f,t ) and the two Fama and French stock risk factors, smb and hml.
Columns 1 (labeled Low ) through 10 (labeled High) represent the stock portfolios ranked in increasing order of real estate ownership, proxied by the ratio of buildings and capitalized leases to property, plant, and equipment (RER1 ). rm,t − r f,t represents the value-weighted monthly returns on CRSP-listed stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rates from Ibbotson and Associates. smb and hml are the average returns on small-stock portfolios minus the average return on big-stock portfolios and the average return on value-stock portfolios minus the average return on growth-stock portfolios, respectively. The column labeled High-Low reports abnormal returns from differences in returns between the high and low real estate decile portfolios.
